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1  Introduction 
In Axelrod’s own words, “it has long been recognized that everyday domestic politics of 
democracies is largely shaped by the nature of the societal cleavages, [and] an important 
question is whether such cleavages will be ameliorated or reinforced through local 
interactions” (Axelrod, 1997, p. 204). We ask in this paper whether it is safe to assume that all 
of the observed differences in the public opinions of different groups within a society is driven 
by differences in deeply rooted ideological opinions within the society. Is it possible that 
observed opinion differences are mere reflections of differences in how various groups are 
linked rather than fundamental differences in the world views of these groups? In this paper we 
use a simple model of opinion diffusion, and we simulate this model to show that a significant 
opinion gap may be observed even within a society with highly susceptible or conformist 
individuals and with no propaganda for a competing argument. 
A crucial step in understanding public opinion formation is understanding how social 
connections may influence public opinion. The analysis of opinion formation based on social 
connections goes back to the seminal works of French (1956), Harary (1959), and DeGroot 
(1974), where individuals’ influence on other members of society has been modeled using 
weighted adjacency matrices to capture interpersonal connectivity and the direction of the 
influence.1  Friedkin and Johnsen (1990, 1999) generalized the repeated opinion updating 
process of the above-mentioned earlier studies by allowing the sustained influence of 
individuals’ initial opinions. Binary opinions and the discrete updating of opinions following 
stochastic rules on interaction have been modeled by Clifford and Sudburry (1973) and Holley 
and Liggett (1975) in the well-known voter model. An important finding of all of the above-
mentioned studies is that individuals’ opinions tend to become more similar upon interaction.    
One of the well-established empirical regularities of social networks is the tendency of birds 
of a feather to flock together, also known as homophily in the network literature.2 Homophily 
describes the tendency of individuals to have disproportionately more social interaction with 
people who are like themselves; that is, they have similar backgrounds (e.g., same ethnicity, 
same gender, same education, etc.) or have similar attachments or interests (e.g., same 
employment, same place of birth, residing in the same location, etc.). Motivated by the 
observation that significant differences exist within a society as far as beliefs or attitudes are 
                                                 
1 See Friedkin and Johnsen (2011) for a detailed discussion on these pioneer models. 
2 Homophily as a term originates from Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954). See McPherson et 
al., (2001) for a detailed overview and discussion. 
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concerned, Axelrod (1997) introduced a social influence model where the probability of 
interaction within a society depends on the cultural proximity of individuals. Hence this is 
where homophily is introduced into the canonical voter model. More recent studies show that 
opinion updating via repeated averaging of peers’ opinions á la DeGroot (1971) is bound to 
lead to a convergence of opinions, that homophily alone is not enough to sustain societal 
cleavages (Golub and Jackson, 2010, 2012; Dandekar et al., 2013), and that any divergence 
from consensus must be a result of confidence thresholds (Hegselmann and Krause, 2002; 
Lanchier, 2010a), biased assimilation (Dandekar et al., 2013), the stubbornness of agents 
(Acemoglu et al., 2013; Friedkin, 2015; Duggins, 2017), xenophobia in highly clustered 
networks (Flache and Macy, 2011), or the amplification of opinions (Baumgaertner et al., 
2016).  
Currarini et al. (2009) show that social networks with homophily display three 
characteristics: members of larger groups have on average more connections per capita, larger 
groups also have a larger fraction of their links to individuals of their own type, and larger 
groups form their own types of links at rates greater than their relative fraction in the population. 
Jackson and Yariv (2007) and Golub and Jackson (2012) establish, in line with the findings of 
Currarini et al. (2009), that diffusion is faster, and time-to-consensus is shorter, among densely 
connected individuals. Halberstam and Knight (2014) deliver very interesting empirical 
evidence by investigating information sharing among Twitter users during the 2012 U.S. 
presidential election, and they show that individuals are disproportionately exposed to like-
minded information. Moreover, members of larger groups are exposed to more tweets (hence 
more information) per capita than members of smaller groups. 
Building on these significant findings we contribute to this literature in three dimensions. 
First, we start our investigation from the state of consensus, and, using stubborn and influential 
agents, we simulate how opinions diverge in a society with homophilic connections. This 
analysis is especially relevant considering nationwide political decisions where citizens are 
asked to side with one of two possible alternatives and that the formation of an opinion requires 
some exposure to fundamental information, which is provided by stubborn and politically 
motivated agents. We show that existence of influential and stubborn agents may lead to 
societal cleavages even if the society is highly susceptive. Second, we provide simulation 
results showing that groups’ size differences have important implications for the observed 
opinion differences of those groups in a homophilic society. Third, we take our simulation 
results to data using a unique dataset on the Swiss referendum outcomes between 2008 and 
2012 and obtain empirical findings that sustain our simulation results.  
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We explore a simple opinion diffusion process where an opinion leader initiates the diffusion 
process by communicating her opinion to her peers. The group to which the opinion leader 
belongs agrees more with the opinion leader than other groups do. We call such an opinion gap 
in favor of the opinion leader’s own group resident opinion leader bias. Our simulations lead 
to two conjectures. First, there exists positive resident opinion leader bias under homophily; 
and second, the resident opinion leader bias depends on the relative size of the two groups. 
In the empirical part of our study we explore referenda data to present an interesting 
empirical case of empirical regularities that fall in line with our simulation results. Referendum 
outcomes are especially valuable for this investigation, because this is where public opinion 
manifests itself. We use a unique dataset combining community-level outcomes of national 
referenda on legislative proposals in Switzerland between 2008 and 2012 and the votes of each 
member of the parliament (MP) on these proposals. This allows us to investigate how an MP’s 
votes on various legislative proposals compare to the majority of voters’ opinions in the 
community where the MP resides (residence community), and to the majority of voters’ 
opinions in its neighbor communities. We find that an MP’s vote matches the majority opinion 
in her residence community in 62.4% of all proposals, whereas this ratio falls to 59.7% for 
neighbor communities. Thus MPs’ roll call behavior matches voters’ decisions on average by 
about 2.7 percentage points better in their residence communities than in neighbor 
communities. This observation repeats itself consistently throughout various subsamples and 
robustness checks, thus we establish the resident MP bias as an empirical regularity. We further 
investigate size effects and find that the relative size of the residence community significantly 
interacts with the resident MP bias in our empirical analysis. These empirical findings fall in 
line with our simulation results.  
In the next section we present a model of opinion diffusion and discuss simulation results. 
In section 3 we discuss the empirical relevance of the model and present our dataset. We show 
our empirical findings in section 4, and we offer further discussion in the final section. 
  
2  Diffusion of Opinions Within and Across Groups 
We present a basic model of opinion diffusion initiated by an opinion leader in a society that is 
divided into two groups. Without loss of generality we assume the two groups to be 
geographically separated and refer to them as communities. We further assume that there exists 
geographic homophily so that individuals in either community have a higher probability to be 
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linked to those residing in the same community than to those residing in the other community. 
Note that this setting can be generalized to any social group exhibiting homophily (based on 
ethnicity, gender, place of birth, etc.). There exists an opinion leader residing in one of the 
communities. We refer to this community as the residence community, and the other community 
is called the neighbor community, denoted by r and n, respectively. The opinion leader initiates 
the opinion diffusion process. Our aim is to isolate the effects of homophily and size differences 
on opinion diffusion within and across groups, and we do not consider the diffusion of 
competing opinions or consensus properties in our setting. 
2.1  Opinion Formation 
Our setting is based on the fundamental structure presented in Friedkin and Johnsen (1999) 
enhanced with a hierarchical structure as discussed in Lu et al. (2009). The opinion of individual 
i at time t is denoted as ߙ௜ሺݐሻ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ, and this can be interpreted as the probability that 
individual i’s opinion coincides with that of the opinion leader’s at time t, where time is 
measured as the number of periods elapsed since the initiation of opinion diffusion by the 
opinion leader. ࡭ሺݐሻ ൌ ሾߙ௜ሺݐሻሿ denotes the vector of opinions in the society, and opinions are 
updated according to the following process: 
 ࡭ሺݐሻ ൌ ࢹࢨࢡሺݐ െ 1ሻ ൅ ሺܫ െ ࢹሻࢡሺ0ሻ,    (1) 
where ࢹ is a diagonal matrix with either ߱௜௜ ൌ 0 or ߱௜௜ ൌ 1, and it captures the stubbornness 
of individuals. ࢨ is an upper triangular matrix with ࢨ ൌ ൣߠ௜௝൧ and ∑ ߠ௜௝௝ஷ௜ ൌ 1. ߠ௜௝ s are 
weights that individual i assigns to her peers’ opinions so that i’s opinion in period t is a 
weighted average of her peers’ opinions from the previous period. We have ߠ௜௝ ∈ ሾ0,1ሻ for all 
pairs ij.  
We employ a stochastic component, namely the probability of link formation between any 
two given individuals (also called linking probability), 3  which is discussed in the next 
subsection in detail. It is important to note that homophily works through linking probabilities 
only, that is, an individual’s linking probabilities with her own type and different type differ 
but once a link is established an individual won’t discriminate between the opinions of her own 
                                                 
3 Linking probability originites from the literature on noncooperative network formation 
games and it denotes the probability that any two randomly chosen nodes in the network 
are connected by a direct link with one another (or equivalently, they have a geodesic 
distance of one from each other). See e.g. Jackson (2008), Bala and Goyal (2000), or 
Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001) for detailed explanations. 
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type and different type individuals. ߠ௜௝	takes a strictly positive value if two conditions are 
fullfilled: ߠ௜௝  is above the first diagonal of ࢨ, and the stochastic event of link formation 
between individuals i and j has been realized so that i and j are connected by an edge. Otherwise 
we have ߠ௜௝ ൌ 0.  
We hold strictly to the textbook definition of homophily that homophily is the increased 
probability of having a direct link between same-type individuals (Newman, 2010). Jackson 
and Rogers (2007) show in a detailed model how the observed homophily in linking 
probabilities is brought about by a repeated process of “meeting friends of friends,” which 
affects the linking probabilities of individuals but not necessarily how they might be influenced 
by the views of each other. In our setting, homophily works only through linking probabilities 
in that individuals are more likely to be directly linked to individuals in their own community 
than those in the other community. Introducing homophily through the influence matrix ࢨ is 
problematic, because this would indicate that individuals assign different weights to 
information coming from different sources. This is not the case in our model, and individuals 
assign the same weight to all of their peers whether or not these peers are located in the same 
community.  
We refer to each individual to whom the opinion leader is directly linked as an influential. 
Influentials constitute a fixed proportion of the society, and they can be understood as 
intermediaries between the opinion leader and the rest of the society; technically they serve as 
injection points.4 Influentials may be highly respected and knowledgeable individuals in the 
society, who provide valuable information relevant for a public discussion topic, or they may 
be manipulative rent seekers who go out and ruthlessly push for the opinion leader’s view. In 
any case these individuals have strong opinions, they can reach to a larger share of the society 
than a regular individual can do, and their opinions are taken seriously by the society. In some 
sense, the opinion leader activates the influentials and sends them out to the society to gain 
support for her point of view. Watts and Dodds (2007) show that the role of influentials is 
theoretically marginal in generating cascades, but their model makes use of heterogeneity in 
how easily individuals get convinced, and this approach is beyond the scope and aim of our 
paper. 
                                                 
4 Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) and Merton (1968) put forward influence models where 
influentials act as intermediaries. Influentials are assumed to have a larger number of 
connections than an average citizen, and their opinions are valued for whatever reason by 
the public. 
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Influentials are stubborn agents such that ߱௜௜ ൌ 0 if individual i is an influential. For any 
other individual j who is not an influential (we call such members of the society a regular 
individual) we have ௝߱௝ ൌ 1, hence j is highly susceptive to others’ opinions. We assume that 
every regular individual has the same initial opinion before the opinion leader initiates the 
opinion diffusion process. The upper triangular shape of ࢨ reveals the hierarchical structure of 
communication within the society. Rows and columns of ࢨ are ordered such that influentials 
take up the upper left corner of ࢨ,	and regular individuals are placed in the rest of the rows and 
columns. The upper triangular shape5 of ࢨ is important for the flow of influence, namely 
between two individuals i and j—either i gets to influence j, or j gets to influence i, but influence 
does not occur both ways, hence if ߠ௜௝ ൐ 0 then it must be ߠ௝௜ ൌ 0. This particular hierarchical 
structure is useful in emphasizing the role of information in opinion formation, that is, 
individuals get to hear not only rhetorical arguments from influentials but they receive 
important information and facts, and they pass these information and facts on to their peers. It 
is another question whether these facts are objective and true or whether they are rigged on 
purpose to serve a spesific agenda, but either way they are pieces of information which an 
individual relies on when updating her opinion. It is important to note that influence is actually 
equivalent to information provision in this setting. 
Opinion updating process runs for two periods, and no influence, i.e. information provision, 
takes place after two periods. Individuals who are linked to influentials come into contact with 
information first hand and are able to pass it on to their peers. Individuals, however, who are 
far away from the source of information are not able to receive convincing amount of 
information and they are not able to pass it on to their peers. As a result, the diffusion process 
dies out at this point. This assumption is backed by the empirical finding of Christakis and 
Fowler (2007), where an individual’s influence through her social network is shown to 
gradually dissipate up to a social distance of three degrees of separation and almost entirely 
ends beyond that social distance. Additional empirical evidence is provided by Bakshy et al. 
(2012) who investigate information diffusion in social networks based on an experiment on an 
online platform and show that individuals who are exposed to information early on are more 
likely to pass it on sooner. Homophily does not lead to polarization by itself (Dandekar, 2013), 
and any hierarchical structure where the influence matrix is irreducible will eventually lead to 
consensus (Lu et al., 2009). To avoid consensus acting as a limiting outcome, opinion updating 
                                                 
5 This structure of local connections generates a rooted directed spanning tree as shown by 
Lu et al. (2009) and discussed in detail by Wu (2005). 
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has to be modeled using, for example, bounded confidence; but, as elaborated in detail by 
Duggins (2017), this is a rigid approach, and there is not enough empirical evidence at all as to 
why trust should follow a binary scheme. Homophily, moreover, has a direct effect on how fast 
consensus is reached (Golub and Jackson, 2012). By halting the process of influence diffusion 
and opinion updating after two time periods, we aim to focus on opinion differences that are 
realized along the way to consensus. This is especially empirically relevant when national 
referenda are considered. In the case of a referendum it is not clear whether the time between 
the dawn of the idea of a legislative change and the day referendum takes place is enough to 
reach consensus.  
2.2  Geographic Homophily in Linking Probabilities 
Linking probabilities make up the stochastic component of our model, and we use them to 
calculate ࢨ ൌ ൣߠ௜௝൧, as will be discussed in this subsection. We denote the population share of 
influentials in the residence (neighbor) community by ߨ௥ை௅	ሺߨ௡ை௅ሻ. Influentials can account for 
the same proportion of the population in either community, or they can be a larger proportion 
in the residence community compared to that in the neighbor community. We refer to these two 
cases as equal shares of influentials and unequal shares of influentials, respectively. We adopt 
the following notation to denote linking probabilities between regular individuals: πrr is the 
linking probability of a regular individual located in the residence community to a regular 
individual in the same community; πrn is the linking probability of a regular individual located 
in the residence community to a regular individual in the neighbor community; πnn is the 
linking probability of a regular individual located in the neighbor community to a regular 
individual in the same community; and finally πnr  is the linking probability of a regular 
individual located in the neighbor community to a regular individual in the residence 
community. We further assume that the linking probability of any two randomly chosen 
individuals is greater if they reside in the same community, thus geographic homophily exists. 
The linking probability of regular individuals in the same community (intra-community 
linking probability) is assumed to be inversely related to the relative size of that community. 
The linking probabilitiy of regular individuals in different communities (inter-community 
linking probability) is smaller than the smallest of the two intra-community linking 
probabilities. Based on these assumptions, we define linking probabilities in the following 
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way: 6  ߨ௥௥ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݈௥ሻఉ , ߨ௡௡ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݈௡ሻఉ , and ߨ௥௡ ൌ ߨ௡௥ ൌ ߛmin	ሺߨ௥௥ߨ௡௡ሻ , where β>1, 
γ∈(0,1), and ݈௥ (	݈௡) is the relative size of the residence (neighbor) community such that ݈௥ ൅
݈௡ ൌ 1. The linking probability parameter β captures the curvature of the probability function 
that individuals who are remote from the opinion leader will be exposed to her views. This can 
be interpreted in the following way: β shows the ability of individuals to convince their peers, 
or, in other words, β captures how quickly the opinion leader’s influence fades away as it 
diffuses. γ captures the degree of homophily in inter-community linking probabilities.7  
Since influentials have larger inter- and intra-community linking probabilities compared to 
regular individuals, we use the following notation whenever we refer to influentials’ linking 
probabilities to regular individuals:8 ߨ௥௥ூ  is the linking probability of an influential located in 
the residence community to a regular individual in the same community; ߨ௥௡ூ 	is the linking 
probability of an influential located in the residence community to a regular individual in the 
neighbor community; ߨ௡௡ூ 	is the linking probability of an influential located in the neighbor 
community to a regular individual in the same community; and ߨ௡௥ூ  is the linking probability 
of an influential located in the neighbor community to a regular individual in the residence 
community. The linking probabilities of influentials and regular individuals follow patterns 
similar to those among regular individuals, but these are necessarily larger so as to reflect the 
well-connectedness of influentials in the society: ߨ௥௥ூ ൌ ߨ௥௥ଵ/ఉ, ߨ௡௡ூ ൌ ߨ௡௡ଵ/ఉ, and ߨ௥௡ூ ൌ ߨ௡௥ூ ൌ
ߨ௥௡ଵ/ఉ. 
Let Nr and Nn denote the population of residence and neighbor communities, respectively. 
Since the linking probability of two individuals varies only due to their locations, the expected 
                                                 
6 Functional forms of linking probabilities shown here are chosen in a way such that they 
embody our basic assumptions on linking probabilities as simple as possible. Aim of this 
section is not to investigate the exact functional form of linking probabilities but to help 
visualizing implications of our fundamental assumptions about the patterns of linking 
probabilities. 
7 γ serves a purely technical purpose. Note that intra-community linking probabilities 
depend on community size, so that individuals in the smaller community will always have 
a smaller intra-community linking probability than inter-community, hence geographic 
homophily holds for individuals in the smaller community even if γ was equal one. The 
situation is different for individuals in the larger community: if γ was equal one, then 
there won’t be difference between their intra-community and inter-community linking 
probabilities, which would mean that there is no geographic homophily in linking 
probabilities of individuals residing in the larger community. Scaling the inter-community 
linking probability by γ∈(0,1) simply makes sure that geographic homophily holds. 
8 Note that influentials may be linked to each other as well, but since this will not affect 
their opinion formation in our model, we leave this out for tractability. 
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number of peers of an individual in either community can be expressed in a uniform way: let 
drr and drn denote the expected number of peers in the residence and neighbor communities, 
respectively, of a regular individual residing in the residence community. Similarly, let dnn and 
dnr  denote the expected number of peers in the neighbor and residence communities, 
respectively, of a regular individual residing in the neighbor community. Hence we have  
݀௥௥ ൌ ߨ௥ை௅ߨ௥௥ூ ሺ ௥ܰ െ 1ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߨ௥ை௅ሻߨ௥௥ሺ ௥ܰ െ 1ሻ; and ݀௥௡ ൌ ߨ௡ை௅ߨ௡௥ூ ௡ܰ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߨ௡ை௅ሻߨ௡௥ ௡ܰ  (2) 
for individuals residing in the residence community, and  
݀௡௡ ൌ ߨ௡ை௅ߨ௡௡ூ ሺ ௡ܰ െ 1ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߨ௡ை௅ሻߨ௡௡ሺ ௡ܰ െ 1ሻ; and ݀௡௥ ൌ ߨ௥ை௅ߨ௥௡ூ ௥ܰ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߨ௥ை௅ሻߨ௥௡ ௥ܰ (3) 
for individuals residing in the neighbor community. 
Assuming an individual gives equal weights to the opinions of her peers, we obtain for every 
individual residing in the residence community ߠ௜௝ ൌ ߠ௥ and for every individual residing in 
the neighbor community ߠ௜௝ ൌ ߠ௡, where  
 ߠ௥ ൌ ଵௗೝೝାௗೝ೙ ; and ߠ௡ ൌ
ଵ
ௗ೙೙ାௗ೙ೝ (4) 
so that the weights an individual assigns to her peers’ opinions always add up to one, as required 
in the setting of the equation (1).  
A Numerical Example. 
Consider a society consisting of 15 individuals, 10 of whom constitute the residence community 
and the other five constitute the neighbor community. That is, Nr=10 and Nn=5, and the 
relative sizes of the communities are thus ݈௥ ൌ 0.67 and ݈௡ ൌ 0.33. Suppose that the share of 
influentials is 0.2 in both communities (hence ߨ௥ை௅ ൌ ߨ௡ை௅ ൌ 0.2 ) so that there are two 
influentials in the residence community and one influential in the neighbor community. We 
assume β=2 and γ=0.5 so that we obtain the following linking probabilities for the influentials 
in the society: ߨ௥௥ூ ൌ 0.33;	ߨ௡௡ூ ൌ 0.67;	ߨ௥௡ூ ൌ ߨ௡௥ூ ൌ 0.24;	 and we obtain the following 
linking probabilities for regular individuals: ߨ௥௥ ൌ 0.11;	ߨ௡௡ ൌ 0.44;	and ߨ௥௡ ൌ ߨ௡௥ ൌ 0.06. 
These linking probabilities yield the following expected values for number of peers: ݀௥௥ ൌ
2.16;	݀௥௡ ൌ 0.48;  ݀௡௡ ൌ 1.94;  ݀௡௡ ൌ 1.44 . Hence an individual residing in the residence 
community is expected to have 2.16 peers in the residence community and 0.48 peers in the 
neighbor community. An individual residing in the neighbor community is expected to have 
1.94 peers in the neighbor community and 1.44 peers in the residence community. It is 
important that the total number of expected peers of a resident of the neighbor community is 
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larger than that of an individual residing in the residence community. This is driven by the 
relative size difference of the two communities, which is in line with findings of Currarini et al. 
(2009). Using the expected numbers of peers we find that ߠ௥ ൌ 0.379 and ߠ௡ ൌ 0.296. An 
individual residing in the residence community assigns a weight of 0.379 to the views of each 
of her peers, irrespective of where a respective peer is residing. Similarly, an individual residing 
in the neighbor community assigns a weight of 0.296 to the views of each of her peers. Hence, 
as mentioned in the previous subsection, individuals do not discriminate between opinions of 
their peers based on homophily. Homophily works solely through linking probabilities. Note 
that all calculations concerning linking probabilities and expected values must be swapped 
between the two communities if the population numbers are swapped; that is, if Nr=5 and Nn= 
10. This is due to the fact that the share of influentials is the same in both communities. In the 
next subsection we investigate the expected values of the opinions in two communities and how 
these evolve over different parameter values and with changes in the communities’ relative 
sizes. 
2.3  Opinion Difference and Community Size 
The baseline level of public opinion is assumed to be α in the residence and neighbor 
communities, and it remains at this level if the opinion leader does not initiate the opinion 
diffusion process by communicating her opinion to influentials. We assume that the influentials 
in the residence (neighbor) community reach a given level of opinion ߙ௥ூ 	ሺߙ௡ூ ሻ immediately 
upon their contact with the opinion leader. Individuals who are linked to influentials and 
individuals who are two degrees away from influentials form their opinions by taking a 
weighted average of their peers’ opinions. 9  Those residing in the residence (neighbor) 
community who are linked to influentials reach an opinion level of ߙ௥௔	ሺߙ௡௔ሻ  on average, 
whereas individuals residing in the residence (neighbor) community who are two degrees away 
from influentials reach an opinion level of ߙ௥௕	ሺߙ௡௕ሻ on average. All other regular individuals 
remain at their initial opinion level α.  
The average opinion of either community is found by taking the average of existing opinions 
in the respective community, weighted by the number of individuals holding these opinions. 
Let ܵ௥ூ, ܵ௥௔, ܵ௥௕  denote the population shares of influentials (I), individuals one degree away 
                                                 
9 See the appendix A.1 for the calculation of expected opinions and population shares. We 
run this analysis using R, and our source code is available upon request. 
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from influentials (a), and individuals two degrees away from influentials (b) residing in the 
residence community. The average opinion in the residence community is thus given by  
 ߙ௥ ൌ ߙ௥ூܵ௥ூ ൅ ߙ௥௔ܵ௥௔ ൅ ߙ௥௕ܵ௥௕ ൅ ߙሺ1 െ ܵ௥ூ െ ܵ௥௔ െ ܵ௥௕ሻ. (5) 
Similarly, let ܵ௥ூ, ܵ௥௔, ܵ௥௕ denote the population shares of influentials (I), individuals one degree 
away from influentials (a), and individuals two degrees away from influentials (b) residing in 
the neighbor community. The average opinion in the neighbor community is given by  
 ߙ௡ ൌ ߙ௡ூ ܵ௡ூ ൅ ߙ௡௔ܵ௡௔ ൅ ߙ௡௕ܵ௡௕ ൅ ߙሺ1 െ ܵ௡ூ െ ܵ௡௔ െ ܵ௡௕ሻ. (6) 
We refer to the difference between these two average opinions, αr−αn, as the opinion gap 
between the two communities. The size and sign of the opinion gap vary with respect to the 
linking probabilities and the relative sizes of the communities, thus it is important to understand 
how the opinion gap changes for different combinations of these key parameters. We simulate 
opinion gaps under two alternative scenarios: first under the assumption of equal shares of 
influentials, meaning that influentials account for the same proportion of the population in either 
community, and second under the assumption of unequal shares of influentials, meaning that 
the opinion leader has disproportionately more links to influentials in her own community. 
Equal Shares of Influentials. 
We assume that shares of influentials are equal in either community, so that ߨ௥ை௅ ൌ ߨ௡ை௅ ൌ
max	ሺߨ௥௥, ߨ௡௡ሻ. Figure 1 shows how the opinion gap changes with the relative size of the 
residence community under the assumption of equal shares of influentials. 
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Figure 1. Community Size and Opinion Gap-I 
 
We provide simulation 10  results for three different values of the linking probability 
parameter β in Figure 1. The three results are qualitatively similar: there is no opinion gap when 
the two communities have the same size. When their sizes are different, then the larger 
community agrees more with the opinion leader than the smaller community does, and this is 
independent of where the opinion leader resides. As the linking probability parameter β varies, 
the opinion gap changes as well. It is, however, not easy to see outright how the opinion gap 
will change, because the size and direction of the opinion gap depends non-linearly on the 
wedge between inter-community and intra-community linking probabilities, which in turn is 
determined by β and the communities’ relative sizes. Considering the two specific cases 
depicted in Figure 1, we observe that a larger opinion gap is obtained for β=6 than that for β=10 
when the resident community has a relative size of lr=0.6; however, this relation is reversed 
                                                 
10 We take γ=0.8 in our simulations, and other values of γ between zero and one don’t 
yield qualitatively different outcomes. Lower values of γ maintain the overall shape of the 
curves, making the opinion gap slightly more pronounced when the relative size of the 
residence community is smaller than 0.3 or greater than 0.7. Alternative figures with 
different γ values will be made available at request. 
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when the relative size of the resident community is larger, for example lr=0.8. The exact value 
of the opinion gap depends on β; of course, nevertheless, it is important to observe that the 
overall pattern of the opinion gap does not vary drastically with β.  
The basic implications of opinion diffusion under geographic homophily with equal shares 
of influentials (i.e., complete symmetry in shares of influentials in the residence and neighbor 
communities) are summarized in the following conjecture:  
Conjecture 1 Under geographic homophily with equal shares of influentials, the larger 
community agrees more with the opinion leader, independent of where the opinion leader 
resides. The opinion gap increases with the relative size difference. If the two communities 
have the same size, then no opinion gap exists.  
This conjecture is a direct result of homophily in linking probabilities, which creates social 
structures similar to those being discussed in the literature of segregation patterns in social 
networks (e.g., Currarini et al., 2009). Recent research on persistent disagreement under 
homophily (e.g., Golub and Jackson 2010, 2012) starts from social disagreement and 
investigates consensus dynamics under homophily, whereas we start from consensus and show 
how the expected opinions in the two communities can diverge as a result of the structure of 
inter- and intra-community linking probabilities. If the two communities have the same size, no 
divergence from consensus is expected. This is simply because the two communities are 
perfectly symmetric to one another in how the opinion leader’s views diffuse through them. If 
the two communities do not have the same size, then geographic homophily interacts with the 
relative size difference between the two communities: although influentials constitute the same 
proportion of the population in both communities, the individuals in the larger community who 
are one degree away from the influentials have a higher exposure to the influentials’ opinions 
than in the smaller community and update their opinions more heavily (i.e., ߙ௥௔ ൐ ߙ௡௔	). This is 
the main mechanism driving the opion gap in favor of the larger community. Hence the flow of 
information becomes amplified in the larger community, and the individuals residing in the 
larger community are exposed to the opinion leader’s views disproportionately more than the 
individuals in the other community are. 
Unequal Shares of Influentials. 
An alternative scenario is depicted in Figure 2, where we abandon the assumption of equal 
shares of influentials in both communities and instead assume unequal shares of influentials; 
that is, the influentials in the residence community make up a larger proportion of the population 
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in that community than the influentials in the neighbor community do. For this scenario we 
assume ߨ௥ை௅ ൌ max	ሺߨ௥௥, ߨ௡௡ሻ and ߨ௡ை௅ ൌ max	ሺߨ௡௥, ߨ௥௡ሻ. Under this assumption we observe 
that the residence community agrees more with the opinion leader than the neighbor community 
does, and this is the case except if the relative size of the residence community is low. For larger 
values of the linking probability parameter β the relative size of the residence community needs 
to be larger before a positive opinion gap in favor of the residence community can be observed. 
We refer to the opinion gap occuring under unequal shares of influentials as the resident opinion 
leader bias. It is important to note that this opinion gap is in favor of the residence community 
for a wide range of relative community size and parameter values. 
  
Figure 2. Community Size and Opinion Gap-II 
 
With more influentials in the residence community and geographic homophily in the linking 
probability of individuals, it is no surprise that the opinion leader’s views diffuse broader in the 
residence community so that the residence community tends to agree more with the opinion 
leader. This leads to a positive resident opinion leader bias even for a small relative size of the 
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residence community. We summarize the implications of opinion diffusion under geographic 
homophily with unequal shares of influentials in the following two conjectures: 
Conjecture 2 There exists a positive resident opinion leader bias under geographic 
homophily with unequal shares of influentials except for a range of very small relative size of 
the residence community.  
Conjecture 3 The resident opinion leader bias increases with the relative size of the 
residence community for most of its domain, and whether it is increasing at an increasing 
(convex) or decreasing rate (concave) depends on communities’ relative sizes and the linking 
probability parameter.  
Our findings in this subsection show that observed differences in the opinions of two groups 
can be driven by the relative size differences of these groups when there is homophily across 
groups such that individuals are more likely to be linked within their own group. Hence, the 
main take-home lesson of our simulations is the following: a non-trivial portion of the opinion 
gap between different groups can be attributed to the structure of social connections within and 
between these groups as well as to size differences between them and not only to the existence 
of deeply rooted and competing opinions within the society.  
 
3  Empirical Content of the Opinion Gap and Data Description 
A plausible setting that would be a good fit for the empirical analysis to find traces of the 
diffusion process described in the previous section has to satisfy several criteria simultaneously. 
The data need to contain groups of individuals, including a reasonable candidate for opinion 
leader, where the groups are clearly separated and yet fairly similar to one another, and the 
opinions of the different groups and the opinion leader must be measurable—that is, there must 
be a setting where opinions are revealed. A plausible empirical test that detects traces of the 
diffusion process described in the previous section must have two aspects: first, it needs to 
reveal the sign and size of the opinion gap between the groups; and second, it has to capture 
how the opinion gap interacts with the groups’ relative sizes. Such an empirical setting would 
be less than perfect but a reasonable one by which to investigate whether or not the mechanisms 
described in the previous section can be empirically relevant.11 
                                                 
11 A perfect setting would be one in which, on top of all mentioned above, individual 
opinions, individual communication connections, and exchange of opinions are observed. 
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The existence of an opinion gap between groups (communities) can be a consequence of 
many different factors; however, an opinion gap that is strictly in favor of the larger group and 
that increases over some plausible (i.e., empirically relevant) domain of the relative size of the 
group containing the opinion leader (residence community) hints that the same mechanisms 
that underlie conjecture 1 might actually be driving such empirical results. If, on the other hand, 
it turns out that there exists a mainly positive opinion gap in favor of the group that hosts the 
opinion leader (namely there exists resident opinion leader bias) that increases over some 
plausible domain of the relative residence community size, then the same mechanisms that 
underlie conjecture 2 and conjecture 3 can be seen as plausible candidates driving such 
empirical results. It is, however, important to note that our approach does not necessarily 
provide empirical proof for what exactly drives an opinion gap but rather what cannot be 
rejected as a possible driving factor. 
We use a unique dataset combining the votes of the members of the Swiss National Council 
(the Lower House of the Parliament) on legislative proposals and the results of national 
referenda in Switzerland between 2008 and 2012. The Swiss National Council consists of 200 
MPs who discuss and vote on legislative proposals. Proposals that are agreed upon in the 
parliament do not automatically become law. If the proposal aims to change the constitution, 
the citizens have to confirm the change in a national referendum. Proposals that are accepted 
by the parliament may be challenged in a national referendum if the citizens demand a 
facultative referendum by collecting 50,000 signatures to this end. Citizens also have the right 
to propose a constitutional amendment upon collecting 100,000 signatures. In such case, MPs 
vote on the text of the initiative to announce their formal recommendation for the referendum. 
However, the power to accept or reject the initiative lies solely in the hands of the citizens. A 
proposal (whether initiated by the National Council or by the citizens) is finally rejected if more 
than half of the population votes against it.12 
The voting activities of each MP are recorded and kept by the parliamentary services, and 
we match these data to another dataset containing the community-level outcomes of national 
referenda. We draw on the official candidates list of the Swiss federal elections to identify each 
MP’s residence community. Hence we observe how an MP votes in the parliament for a 
legislative proposal and how the majority of the community where she is residing votes in the 
corresponding referendum on the same proposal. We also collect information on the birthplaces 
                                                 
12 In addition to the majority of citizens, constitutional amendments require a double 
majority of citizens and cantons (so called Ständemehr). 
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of MPs and use it in further robustness tests. Voting in the parliament always precedes the 
popular vote so that the parliamentary vote of each MP about the proposal that is being 
discussed is revealed well in advance of the referendum. The parliamentary vote of an MP is 
practically her voting recommendation for the corresponding referendum, and this 
recommendation cannot be altered (at least, not credibly) later on. This fine-grained data 
structure allows us to identify how closely preferences expressed by voters coincide with MPs’ 
positions. 
In particular, we compare how an MP’s residence community matches this MP’s position 
and how communities that share a common border with this residence community (referred to 
as neighbor communities) match the same MP’s position. Thus, we directly measure whether 
residence and neighbor communities’ revealed opinions in a referendum correspond to MPs’ 
decisions revealed in the parliamentary vote prior to that referendum. We use each MP’s vote 
on a proposal and the outcome of the corresponding referendum in the MP’s residence and 
neighbor communities to create a binary dependent variable, which we refer to as the opinion 
match: if the majority in a community voted yes in a referendum, we take the revealed 
preference of that community to be in favor of that proposal. If the majority voted no, then the 
community does not agree with the proposal. The opinion match for an MP–community pair 
for a given proposal is one if both the MP and the community, simultaneously, accepted or 
rejected the proposal. For proposals where the MPs and communities express different positions 
the opinion match is zero.13 The binary variable opinion match is employed as the dependent 
variable in our empirical analysis, where the unit of observation is an MP–community–
referendum triplet, and community refers to either the MP’s residence community or neighbor 
communities. A systematic opinion gap between the residence and neighbor communities in 
favor of the residence community will be what we refer to as the resident opinion leader bias 
in the previous section, and we rename it here the resident MP bias so as to better convey the 
setting of our empirical analysis. 
Each of the 26 Swiss cantons is an electoral district so that the constituency of each MP is 
made of voters in their respective canton. Communities are subdivisions of cantons, and an 
MP’s residence community as well as neighbor communities make up a rather small fraction of 
the MP’s constituency,14 since the size of most communities is often below 3,000 inhabitants. 
In Figure 3 we map the locations of MPs’ residence communities and their neighbors.  
                                                 
13 MPs’ abstentions are excluded from the analysis. 
14 Number of communities contained in each canton and distribution of population in 
communities are documented in figure A1 and table A1 in the appendix. 
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Figure 3. Residence Communities of MPs and their Neighbor Communities 
 
 
 
Legislative proposals15 that are covered in our dataset concern solely national policy with 
potential differential ramifications at the district (canton) level only, but there are no differential 
ramifications at the community level for residence and neighbor communities. As a result, an 
MP’s residence community and neighbor communities are expected to be symmetrically 
affected by the national policy change in question. Since we observe referenda outcomes 
separately for each community within the same constituency, we are able to investigate the 
degree of the opinion match between MPs and their residence and neighbor communities. 
Another advantage in focusing on neighbor communities is that we minimize the heterogeneity 
across communities that are being compared to one another for their opinion match with the 
local MP. It can rightfully be argued that no two neighboring communities are perfect 
substitutes for one another, of course; but it can very well be expected that variations originating 
from geographical, cultural, and locational traits (e.g., being close to an important industrial 
district, being close to an airport, etc.) are minimized in the case of two neighboring 
communities as opposed to two randomly chosen communities. One can also argue that these 
communities differ in their opinions and preferences and that an MP chooses to reside in the 
                                                 
15 A complete list of proposals and initiatives taken to referenda between 2008 and 2012 
(hence covered in our dataset) is shown in table A2 in the appendix. 
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residence community in the first place, because this community better fits her own opinions 
and preferences. Nevertheless, our methodology to compare only neighboring communities 
serves to minimize such differences. Arguing that such differences drive our results would be 
equivalent to saying that initial opinion and preference differences between the residence 
community and its neighbor communities must be so severe and rich (going in many different 
dimensions) that they are carried over to each public debate and reveal themselves in most of 
the proposals that are being voted upon. We find such wide and deep differences between any 
two communities that share a common border an extreme case, which cannot meaningfully 
plague our results.16 
Divergence between voters’ and politicians’ preferences has received substantial attention 
in the literature, and it has been discussed in great detail how MPs’ roll call behavior does not 
fully reflect voters’ preferences.17 We take an alternative stand here and claim that MPs are not 
merely passive representatives of the median voter’s views but that MPs are rather opinion 
leaders, even ideological and political innovators, who set the tone for and push their opinions 
in society. An important merit in focusing on Switzerland is that Swiss MPs reside in their 
initial residential address and are not required to move to the seat of the parliament18 during 
their tenure. Thus, an MP is in touch with the voters in her residence community in close 
proximity, and these voters are likely to be informed about the opinions of the MP better than 
voters in other communities in the same electoral district. In the same way, voters interact with 
MPs and get to know their take on national political issues. This does not eliminate a possible 
reverse causation that MPs who are well-connected within their residence communities will be 
better informed about what the voters want and hence cater to their will. Nevertheless, the 
incentives that are needed for the significance of such reverse causation are not apparent in this 
setting, especially since there is no “pork barrel,” as MPs are elected in electoral districts that 
comprise their residence and the neighboring communities. Hence, it remains a valid argument 
that MPs act as opinion leaders in their residence communities.  
                                                 
16 We further rule out such explanations in robustness tests by analyzing MPs who were 
born in their residence community. 
17 There is rich literature documenting and discussing to what extend politicians fail to 
represent voters’ preferences, and how this can be explained (see Gerber and Lewis 2004, 
for example). Ågren et al., (2006), Grofman (2004), Matsusaka (2010), Padovano (2013), 
Portmann et al., (2012), Giger and Klüver (2015), provide an overview of related 
literature in economics as well as in political science. 
18 The Swiss National Parliament is located in Bern which can be reached from most parts 
of the country within two to three hours by train. 
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The data on Swiss national referenda offer a unique opportunity for empirical investigation 
due to at least five distinct features. First, individuals reveal their preference on policy issues in 
a referendum, since they are able to answer a decisive and clear-cut question with a yes or no 
(e.g., Schneider et al., 1981; Frey 1994, Carey and Hix 2013; Hessami 2016). Second, MPs vote 
on precisely the same proposals in the parliament as voters do in referenda such that both 
decisions are directly comparable (see Stadelmann et al., 2013). Third, MPs vote in the 
parliament before voters get to vote in referenda so that MPs can credibly be claimed to have 
sufficient time to initiate the local opinion diffusion process. Fourth, MPs actually reside in the 
communities that they report as their residence so that we have good candidates for local 
opinion leadership in these communities. Fifth, residence and neighbor communities together 
represent only a small part of an MP’s electoral district, and national policies decided in 
referenda do not have differential effects on the two communities such that a pork barrel 
situation is ruled out as a possible cause for opinion gaps. We describe the details of this 
interesting setting in the next subsection and discuss how the resident opinion leader bias may 
show up in this context. 
 
4  Searching for the Resident MP Bias: Residence vs. Neighbor 
Communities 
We use a logit model to regress the binary dependent variable opinion match on the indicator 
variable residence community, which distinguishes MPs’ residence from neighbor 
communities, and on fixed effects for referenda and electoral districts (cantons) of MPs such 
that 
 Opinion match=Λ(α+ResidenceCommunity+ϱ+μ). (7) 
The independent variable residence community is one if the opinion match refers to the MP–
community pair where the community at hand is the MP’s residence community, and it is zero 
if the opinion match refers to pairs of the MP and any of the neighbor communities. Λ(.) is the 
logistic function, ϱ denotes referendum fixed effect, and μ denotes canton or MP fixed effect.19  
Our baseline results are presented in Table 1. In panel A we consider all MP–community–
referendum triplets such that each neighboring community of an MP’s residence community 
                                                 
19 Instead of MP fixed effects, we use electoral district fixed (canton) in some estimations. 
MPs in our sample did not change their electoral district during the time period analyzed. 
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enters the regression as a separate observation. Coefficient estimations for the logit model 
where the dependent variable is the opinion match are shown in columns (1) to (4), and columns 
(5) and (6) show the results obtained from the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations (linear 
probability models). 
Positive and significant coefficients for residence community reveal an interesting relation: 
in every specification across panel A in Table 1, the opinion match of MPs and their residence 
communities is significantly larger than that of MPs and their neighbor communities. Hence, 
there exists a significantly higher probability that a community agrees with an MP if the MP is 
residing in that community. The discrete effects of the residence community (and its coefficient 
in the case of linear probability models) in panel A show that the probability that an MP’s vote 
and the majority vote of her residence community coincide is about 3.2 to 3.9 percentage points 
larger than the probability that an MP’s vote and the majority vote of a neighboring community 
coincide.20 These effects are not only statistically significant but also economically relevant, 
considering that three of the last four U.S. presidential elections were decided by a margin of 
less than four percentage points. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 We calculate discrete effects applying the Delta-Method as suggested by Ai et al., 
(2003). 
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Table 1. Representation of the Resident Community - Baseline Regressions 
Dependent variable: match between MP's vote and referendum outcome 
 A. Residence Community vs. All Neighbor Communities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5 OLS) (6 OLS) 
Residence Community 0.148*** 
(0.039) 
0.161*** 
(0.042) 
0.160*** 
(0.040) 
0.154*** 
(0.042) 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
Intercept 0.375*** 
(0.037) 
0.418 
(0.261) 
0.287 
(0.293) 
0.653** 
(0.261) 
0.574*** 
(0.069) 
0.653*** 
(0.059) 
Referendum FE no yes yes yes yes yes 
Canton FE no no yes no yes no 
MP FE no no no yes no yes 
Discrete Effect: 
Neighbor to Residence 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.034***     
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.001 0.133 0.14 0.18 0.095 0.125 
Observations 53403 53403 53403 53403 53403 53403 
   
 B. Residence Community vs. a Single "Synthetic" Neighbor Community 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5 OLS) (6 OLS) 
Residence Community 0.147*** 
(0.039) 
0.164*** 
(0.043) 
0.165*** 
(0.043) 
0.174*** 
(0.045) 
0.035*** 
(0.009) 
0.035*** 
(0.009) 
Intercept 0.377*** 
(0.034) 
0.663*** 
(0.233) 
0.523* 
(0.274) 
1.322*** 
(0.264) 
0.630*** 
(0.060) 
0.783*** 
(0.053) 
Referendum FE no yes yes yes yes yes 
Canton FE no no yes no yes no 
MP FE no no no yes no yes 
Discrete Effect: 
Neighbor to Residence 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.027***     
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.002 0.155 0.161 0.216 0.112 0.151 
Observations 11908 11908 11908 11908 11908 11908 
Note: Dependent var. is the matching between MP's vote and ref. outcome.   
     Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by residence-neighbor-pair. 
     ***, **, and * denote significance levels p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.  
 
When all neighbor communities are considered separately for an MP, as we do in panel A 
of Table 1, an important potential problem arises: since there is no control for the size of the 
communities in the calculation of the opinion match, the majority votes of smaller neighbors 
will be over-represented in the sample. Hence it is possible that the coefficients of the residence 
community are either over-estimated or under-estimated depending on its relative size. A 
solution to this potential problem and a conservative test for our conjectures is to create 
synthetic neighbor communities. We pool together the citizens of all neighbor communities of 
an MP’s residence community and create a single synthetic neighbor community, which also 
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becomes considerably larger in terms of population size than the residence community in most 
cases.21 The opinion match of the MP and the newly created synthetic neighbor community is 
one if the majority of the pooled population voted in the same way as the MP and zero 
otherwise. 
Table 1’s panel B presents the regression results using synthetic neighbor communities. The 
residence community’s discrete effect and significance in each of the six specifications are very 
similar to those in panel A: the discrete effect turns out to be between 3.5 and 3.8 percentage 
points except for the specification (4) where the discrete effect is 2.7. Thus the opinion gap 
remains positive and statistically significant even after introducing synthetic neighbor 
communities to take into account any problems related to size difference and aggregation 
effects. 
Our empirical analysis thus far establishes the existence of a statistically significant opinion 
gap between communities in favor of MPs’ residence communities as an empirical regularity.22 
It is important to note that this empirical regularity cannot yet be linked to our opinion diffusion 
model discussed in the simulation section of this paper, because the relative size of communities 
needs to be controlled for as well. Before we introduce relative size differences into our 
empirical analysis, we provide in the next subsection a brief discussion on the robustness of the 
empirical regularity established above.  
4.1  Robustness: Opinion Gap Across Subsamples 
We analyze the opinion gap across different subsamples of our dataset to check for the 
robustness of our findings documented in the previous subsection. The results are shown in 
Table 2. The opinion match of every single neighbor community with the corresponding MP is 
used as a separate observation in panel A, and we use a single synthetic neighbor community 
for each residence community in panel B. We restrict our analysis in column (1) to the residence 
communities of MPs that reside in the same community as their birth place. This setting 
minimizes any possible self-selection of MPs of their residence communities due to differences 
in preferences, since the cost of moving will still be contained in such a decision process. In 
                                                 
21 Synthetic communities as well as matching representative’s votes with local referenda 
outcomes are discussed in depth in Hermann and Leuthold (2007). 
22 We provide further evidence on the significance of the opinion gap by using the actual 
share of votes in residence and neighbor communities that match MP’s vote instead of 
using the binary variable opinion match. Although point estimates for the coefficient of 
Residence Community are smaller than those in Table 1, they remain positive and 
significant. Estimation results are shown in Table A5 in the appendix. 
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column (3) we look at MPs who hold a local (political) office in their residence community. 
These two columns represent cases where the alignment of the residence community with the 
MP can be expected to be more likely due to long-established personal and political 
relationships. In column (2) we eliminate the neighbor communities in another canton.23 The 
coefficients for residence community remain statistically significant and positive across these 
subsamples. The discrete effects when all neighbor communities are included separately are 
between 3.1 and 3.4 percentage points, and those from the estimation based on synthetic 
neighbor communities are between 2.5 and 2.9 percentage points. Thus, we obtain not only 
qualitatively but also quantitatively similar results in cases where the MP possibly has strong 
local connections compared to those in Table 1.  
Column (4) shows a specific subset of referenda such that the time between when MPs vote 
in the parliament and voters vote in referenda is above the median of such time for all referenda 
covered in our dataset. When there is more time between the parliamentary and the popular 
vote, we still obtain a significant and positive coefficient for residence community where 
estimations using separate neighbor communities and a single synthetic neighbor yield discrete 
effects of 2.6 and 2.7 percentage points, respectively. A plausible explanation for the slight 
decrease in discrete effects is that the convergence process between communities may have 
begun to have an effect such that the residence and neighbor communities reach the later stages 
of the opinion diffusion process so that they are getting closer to a consensus. 
 
  
                                                 
23 Cantons constitute MPs’ electoral districts, and it is quite possible that an MP is more 
responsive to her residence community if the neighbors lie outside the electoral district. 
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Table 2. Representation of the Resident Community - Robustness 
Dependent variable: match between MP's vote and referendum outcome 
    
 A. Residence Community vs. All Neighbor Communities 
 
Residence is 
Birthplace No Border Local Office
Long Time 
before 
Voting 
Resident 
MPs w/same 
View 
Neighbor 
MPs w/same 
View 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Residence Community 0.150** 
(0.060) 
0.153*** 
(0.043) 
0.134*** 
(0.039) 
0.105*** 
(0.037) 
0.689*** 
(0.149) 
0.172 
(0.134) 
Intercept 0.668* 
(0.377) 
0.629** 
(0.283) 
0.450 
(0.310) 
0.292 
(0.234) 
1.707*** 
(0.005) 
1.205*** 
(0.006) 
Referendum FE yes yes yes yes no no 
Canton FE no no no no no no 
MP FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Discrete Effect: 
Neighbor to 
Residence 
0.033** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.070*** 0.029 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.195 0.184 0.176 0.120 0.267 0.102 
Observations 18202 48148 31317 18028 6265 12445 
   
B. Residence Community vs. a Single "Synthetic" Neighbor Community 
Residence is 
Birthplace No Border Local Office
Long Time 
before 
Voting 
Resident 
MPs w/same 
View 
Neighbor 
MPs w/same 
View 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Residence Community 0.191*** 
(0.060) 
0.160*** 
(0.046) 
0.165*** 
(0.045) 
0.128*** 
(0.034) 
1.319*** 
(0.475) 
0.255 
(0.203) 
Intercept 1.366*** 
(0.419) 
1.312*** 
(0.261) 
1.173*** 
(0.287) 
0.755*** 
(0.238) 
-0.074 
(1.579) 
0.543 
(0.855) 
Referendum FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Canton FE no no no no no yes 
MP FE yes yes yes yes yes no 
Discrete Effect: 
Neighbor to 
Residence 
0.029** 0.025** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.295 0.057 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.226 0.216 0.200 0.170 0.668 0.545 
Observations 3528 11970 6840 4014 1082 2344 
Note: Dependent var. is the matching between MP's vote and ref. outcome.   
      Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by residence-neighbor-pair. 
      ***, **, and * denote significance levels p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.  
 
 
The subsample in column (5) is restricted to residence communities where several MPs 
reside, and these MPs have voted in the same way for the given legislative proposal, hence they 
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have the same opinion about the subject at hand. The coefficient for resident community is very 
high and highly significant This is an expected outcome, because with several residing MPs 
sharing the same opinion the opinion gap is expected to be amplified. Finally, we restrict our 
analysis in column (6) to a subsample where there is at least one MP residing in the neighbor 
community and moreover, she has (or they have) the same opinion as the MP in the residence 
community. The coefficient of resident community turns out insignificant in this case, as 
expected, because MPs in either community promote the same view, and as a result we do not 
observe a significant opinion gap. Additional robustness results based on further subsamples 
are shown in table A6 in the appendix. These additional robustness checks further support the 
existence of a significant and economically relevant opinion gap between residence and 
neighbor communities in favor of the residence community. 
In the appendix we provide further robustness checks. Tables A3 and A4 are counterparts of 
tables 1 and 2 using an alternative depedent variable. The dependent variable in tables A3 and 
A4 is the actual share of votes in residence and neighbor communities that match MP's vote, 
e.g. if the MP voted "no" on a proposal and 55% of votes in a community is "no" in the 
corresponding referendum, then the percentage match between the MP and that community is 
55%. Similarly, if 48% of a community voted in the same way as the MP then the percentage 
match is 48%. Although point estimates for the coefficient of Residence Community are smaller 
in table A3 than those in table 1, they remain positive and highly significant.  
4.2  Relative Community Size and the Resident MP Bias 
We introduce the size difference between residence communities and their neighbors as an 
additional independent variable and also control for the interaction between the size difference 
and the indicator variable for the residence community. This allows us to test the empirical 
relevance of the three conjectures formulated following our simulations. The regression results 
are shown in Table 3, panel A, where each neighbor is considered separately, and panel B, 
where neighbor communities are aggregated into a single synthetic community. 
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Table 3. Resident MP Bias and Size Difference of Resident and Neighbor Communities 
Dependent variable: match between MP's vote and referendum outcome 
 A. Residence Community vs. All Neighbor Communities 
 All All Local Office 
Long Time 
before 
Voting 
Resident 
MPs w/same 
View 
Neighbor 
MPs w/same 
View 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Residence Community 0.201*** 
(0.066) 
0.299*** 
(0.057) 
0.246*** 
(0.059) 
0.220*** 
(0.060) 
0.946*** 
(0.313) 
0.264 
(0.212) 
Size Difference (Residence-
Neighbor) 
-0.048 
(0.053) 
0.059 
(0.053) 
0.057 
(0.061) 
0.058 
(0.055) 
0.0008 
(0.356) 
-0.021 
(0.076) 
Residence*SizeDifference 0.222*** 
(0.086) 
0.265*** 
(0.084) 
0.199** 
(0.088) 
0.186** 
(0.079) 
1.123*** 
(0.411) 
0.368 
(0.329) 
Intercept 0.306 
(0.289) 
0.594** 
(0.247) 
0.394 
(0.293) 
0.235 
(0.234) 
1.698*** 
(0.323) 
1.218*** 
(0.069) 
Referendum FE yes yes yes yes no no 
Canton FE yes no no no no no 
MP FE no yes yes yes yes yes 
Discrete Effect: (3rdQuartile) 0.095*** 0.109*** 0.096*** 0.091*** 0.130*** 0.091 
Discrete Effect: (1stQuartile) 0.053*** 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.057*** 0.120*** 0.058 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.14 0.181 0.176 0.120 0.268 0.102 
Observations 53403 53403 31317 18028 6265 12445 
B. Residence Comm. vs. a Single "Synthetic" Neighbor Comm. 
 All All Local Office 
Long Time 
before 
Voting 
Resident 
MPs w/same 
View 
Neighbor 
MPs w/same 
View 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Residence Community 0.253*** 
(0.063) 
0.267*** 
(0.065) 
0.224*** 
(0.056) 
0.167*** 
(0.044) 
1.538*** 
(0.555) 
0.414 
(0.295) 
Size Difference (Residence-
Neighbor) 
-0.049 
(0.092) 
-0.513 
(0.417) 
-0.805* 
(0.425) 
-0.541 
(0.675) 
-33.593 
(21.460) 
-0.161 
(0.269) 
Residence*SizeDifference 0.231** 
(0.098) 
0.244** 
(0.102) 
0.172 
(0.112) 
0.103 
(0.078) 
1.028 
(0.999) 
0.566 
(0.476) 
Intercept 0.522* 
(0.273) 
1.298*** 
(0.269) 
1.184*** 
(0.288) 
0.762*** 
(0.242) 
1.743 
(1.720) 
0.576 
(0.959) 
Referendum FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Canton FE yes no no no no yes 
MP FE no yes yes yes yes no 
Discrete Effect: (3rdQuartile) 0.058*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.332 0.097 
Discrete Effect: (1stQuartile) 0.019* 0.011* 0.012 0.016* 0.00004 0.002 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.162 0.216 0.200 0.170 0.673 0.546 
Observations 11908 11908 6840 4014 1082 2344 
Note: Dependent var. is the matching between MP's vote and ref. outcome.   
     Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by residence-neighbor-pair. 
     ***, **, and * denote significance levels p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.   
The first two columns of Table 3 display estimation results based on our complete dataset, 
and columns (3) to (6) correspond to the same numbered columns in Table 2. Residence 
community remains significant and positive throughout all specifications except for column (6), 
as expected, where the subsample contains residence communities that have neighbors with an 
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MP of the same opinion as the MP residing in the residence community. The interaction of the 
relative size difference and resident community has positive and significant coefficients in all 
of the five columns where resident community is also significant. Hence the opinion gap in 
favor of the residence community increases with the relative size difference of residence and 
neighbor communities: for MPs residing in residence communities of similar size we expect a 
larger resident MP bias for the residence community that has smaller neighbors. Similarly, for 
residence communities with neighbor communities of comparable size, we expect a larger 
resident MP bias for the larger residence community.24  
According to Table 3, the probability that a residence community agrees with the resident 
MP is significantly higher than that for its neighbor community if these communities are of 
equal size—this is namely the baseline effect of the variable residence community. When the 
residence community is smaller than its neighbor, we still expect a positive resident MP bias 
but not as large as in the case when the two communities are of equal size. A negative total 
effect of the residence community is possible if the residence community is smaller than one-
ninth of the neighbor community, according to the coefficients listed in column (1), whereas 
such a negative total effect is impossible according to the specification used in column (2) as 
well as according to most of the restricted subsamples investigated in columns (3) to (6). This 
empirical finding corresponds to the resident opinion leader bias discussed in the simulation 
section under the assumption of unequal shares of influentials, and hence we refer to its 
empirical counterpart as the resident MP bias.  
Third quartile and first quartile discrete effects show the level of the resident MP bias when 
the total effect of the variable residence community is evaluated at the third and first quartiles, 
respectively, of the size difference between residence and neighbor communities. Pairs of 
residence and neighbor communities are ranked from the largest difference in favor of residence 
community to the largest difference in favor of neighbor community. Using our complete 
sample as reported in columns (1) and (2), the discrete effect (i.e., the resident MP bias) 
evaluated at the third quartile of this ranking is about 9.5 to 10.9 percentage points, whereas 
that evaluated at the first quartile is about 5.3 to 7 percentage points.  
When we consider synthetic neighbor communities, the coefficient of the interaction effect 
between the relative size and the resident community turns out to be significant and positive for 
the whole sample. The corresponding discrete effects in third and first quartiles in the case of a 
                                                 
24 As shown in detail in the appendix, using a percentage match variable (table A5) instead 
of a binary match indicator (table 3) yields qualitatively very similar results.  
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single synthetic neighbor community range from 4.2 to 5.8 percentage points and from 1.1 to 
1.9 percentage points, respectively. No significant interaction effect is obtained for the 
subsamples that we investigate in columns (3) to (6). The relative size variation of the residence 
communities that make up our restricted subsamples in columns (3) to (6) most likely does not 
vary enough to obtain statistical significance for these interaction effects. Nevertheless, the 
levels of the resident MP bias that are significantly different from zero are 3.6 to 3.9 percentage 
points at the third quartile and 1.6 percentage points at the first quartile.  
We take the existence of the resident MP bias and size effects discussed above to hint at the 
following: if at least some part of these empirical results is driven by the mechanisms described 
in the simulation section of this paper, then the unequal shares of influentials (as depicted in 
Figure 3) across the two communities must be the case and not the equal shares of influentials, 
thus confirming geographical homophily in inter-community links, especially including those 
of the resident MP. Overall, our empirical analysis does not prove that opinion diffusion 
properties under homophily drive our empirical results; however, the simulation setting 
corresponding to the case of unequal shares of influentials cannot be rejected as a possible 
driving factor of our empirical results, especially considering that our empirical setting is such 
that inherent opinion differences between communities are minimized (as explained in detail in 
the data section) and that MPs’ motivation to favor their residence communities (pork barreling, 
maximizing re-election chances, etc.) is eliminated.  
Further results about communities’ size differences and interaction with the residence 
community using various subsamples are shown in Table A7 in the appendix, where similar 
and robust empirical results are obtained.  
 
5  Discussion and Conclusion 
We investigate the diffusion of opinions within and between groups where intra-group and 
inter-group linking probabilities display homophily, and we model a simple diffusion process 
of influence. We assume that there exists an opinion leader in one of the two groups and that 
the opinion leader acts as the initiator of the diffusion process to spread her opinions. We show 
that relative size differences between groups are always associated with an opinion gap. For a 
wide range of parameter values we obtain what we call the resident opinion leader bias, that is, 
the group to which the opinion leader belongs (residence community) agrees on average more 
with the opinion leader than the other group does. Moreover, the resident opinion leader bias 
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increases with the relative size of the residence community for most of the empirically relevant 
range of its relative size. 
Taking this conjecture to data requires a highly detailed dataset, where each individual’s 
opinions, personal connections, and communications are revealed. Previous studies have 
focused on the diffusion of views and news using data based on social media interactions; 
however, they lack observations on individuals’ personal opinions and, in particular, whether 
these opinions translate into actual behavior. We employ a dataset of Swiss referendum 
decisions between 2008 and 2012 in our empirical analysis where referenda decisions on 
legislative proposals are recorded at the community level, the votes of MPs on corresponding 
proposals are recorded as well, and MPs’ residence communities are known. This dataset has 
the unique advantage of matching the actual decisions of MPs and voters at the community 
level on exactly the same national policy issues. Such a direct measure of actual political 
representation at the local level is new in the literature. 
Our baseline regressions reveal that the referendum decision in a community where an MP 
resides tends to agree significantly more with the vote of the MP on the corresponding 
legislative proposal: the probability that the residence community agrees with the resident MP 
is about three to four percentage points greater than that of neighbor communities. An analysis 
of the interaction between communities’ relative size and the opinion gap reveals that 
significant interaction effects exist, the opinion gap is in favor of smaller residence 
communities, and the opinion gap increases with the relative size of the residence community. 
We refer to this effect as the resident MP bias, which is simply the empirical counterpart to the 
resident opinion leader bias introduced in the simulation section. This finding is statistically 
robust and economically relevant throughout different subsamples and alternative 
specifications. Although it is not straightforward to empirically pinpoint all effects observed in 
our simulations, our empirical investigation reveals patterns that align closely with the 
conjectures obtained from the simulations, especially conjecture 2 and conjecture 3 derived 
under the assumption of unequal shares of influentials (i.e., when the opinion leader is assumed 
to be better connected within her residence community than in the neighbor community). The 
phenomenon of residence community bias is empirically highly robust even though politicians 
are elected in the whole district comprised of numerous communities, and this phenomenon has 
not been observed in such a direct way before nor has an explanation been offered. 
Thus, observed opinion gaps can be driven at least partially by purely technical artifacts that 
underlie the social web of different groups within society. However, we emphasize that the 
interpretation of an observed opinion gap requires far more attention if the aim is to identify the 
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channels that lead to the opinion gap and in particular to understand how severe the opinion gap 
really is due to fundamental differences in ideas held by different groups. In a world where 
social connections reveal significant traces of homophily, and assuming that MPs actually act 
as opinion leaders and not as representative agents that passively conform to the views of the 
median voter, MPs need to reach out to the public and promote their opinions and to establish 
relations with influential individuals in distant communities as well if they want to create a 
significant change in people’s opinions and lead the way.  
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A  Appendix 
A.1  Opinion Diffusion: Population Shares and Opinions of 
Individuals One or Two Degrees Away from Influentials 
Influentials, individuals that are directly linked to influentials (one degree away from 
influentials) and individuals that are linked to those (two degrees away from influentials) make 
up the three layers of the society within each community that actually update their opinions. 
We show in this section how we calculate the opinions of these groups and their shares within 
each community, because we use these information to calculate the expected opinion in either 
community and the opinion gap. 
Share of influentials in residence (neighbor) community is ܵ௥ூ ൌ ߨ௥ை௅	ሺܵ௡ூ ൌ ߨ௡ை௅ሻ, and we assume they reach an opinion level of ߙ௥ூ 	ሺߙ௡ூ ሻ upon their contact with the opinion leader.  Share of individuals in residence (neighbor) community that are one degree away from 
influentials is denoted by ܵ௥௔	ሺܵ௡௔ሻ and calculated in the following way:  
ܵ௥௔ ൌ ሺ1 െ ܵ௥ூሻ ቀ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߨ௥௥ூ ሻగೝೀಽேೝሺ1 െ ߨ௡௥ூ ሻగ೙ೀಽே೙ቁ  (A1) 
ܵ௡௔ ൌ ሺ1 െ ܵ௡ூ ሻሺ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߨ௡௡ூ ሻగ೙ೀಽே೙ሺ1 െ ߨ௥௡ூ ሻగೝೀಽேೝሻ   (A2) 
Expected opinion of an individual in this group is obtained in the following way:  
 
	ߙ௥௔ ൌ ߠ௥ሾ ௥ܰܵ௥ூߨ௥௥ூ ߙ௥ூ ൅ ௡ܰܵ௡ூߨ௡௥ூ ߙ௡ூ ൅ ௥ܰሺ1 െ ܵ௥ூ െ ܵ௥௔ሻߨ௥௥ߙ ൅ ௡ܰሺ1 െ ܵ௡ூ െ ܵ௡௔ሻߨ௡௥ߙሿ (A3)  
ߙ௡௔ ൌ ߠ௡ሾ ௡ܰܵ௡ூߨ௡௡ூ ߙ௡ூ ൅ ௥ܰܵ௥ூߨ௥௡ூ ߙ௥ூ ൅ ௡ܰሺ1 െ ܵ௡ூ െ ܵ௡௔ሻߨ௡௡ߙ ൅ ௥ܰሺ1 െ ܵ௥ூ െ ܵ௥௔ሻߨ௥௡ߙ] (A4) 
 
Share of individuals in residence (neighbor) community that are two degrees away from 
influentials is denoted by ܵ௥௕	ሺܵ௡௕ሻ and calculated in the following way:  
 ܵ௥௕ ൌ ሺ1 െ ܵ௥ூ െ ܵ௥௔ሻሺ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߨ௥௥ሻௌೝೌ ேೝሺ1 െ ߨ௡௥ሻௌ೙ೌே೙ሻ (A5) 
ܵ௡௕ ൌ ሺ1 െ ܵ௡ூ െ ܵ௡௔ሻሺ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߨ௡௡ሻௌ೙ೌே೙ሺ1 െ ߨ௥௡ሻௌೝೌ ேೝሻ (A6) 
Expected opinion of an individual in this group is obtained in the following way:  
 
ߙ௥௕ ൌ ߠ௥ሾ ௥ܰܵ௥௔ߨ௥௥௔ ߙ௥௔ ൅ ௡ܰܵ௡௔ߨ௡௥ߙ௡௔ ൅ ௥ܰ൫1 െ ܵ௥ூ െ ܵ௥௔ െ ܵ௥௕൯ߨ௥௥ߙ ൅ ௡ܰ൫1 െ ܵ௡ூ െ ܵ௡௔ െ ܵ௡௕൯ߨ௡௥ߙሿ 
(A7) 
 
ߙ௡௕ ൌ ߠ௡ሾ ௡ܰܵ௡௔ߨ௡௡ߙ௡௔ ൅ ௥ܰܵ௥௔ߨ௥௡ߙ௥௔ ൅ ௡ܰ൫1 െ ܵ௡ூ െ ܵ௡௔ െ ܵ௡௕൯ߨ௡௡ߙ ൅ ௥ܰሺ1 െ ܵ௥ூ െ ܵ௥௔ െ ܵ௥௕ሻߨ௥௡ߙ] 
(A8) 
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A.2 Background Information: Swiss Cantons, Municipalities, and 
Referenda 
 
Figure A1. Distribution of Community Size in Switzerland 
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Table A1. Swiss Cantons and 
Municipalities 
Canton Number of municipalities Canton Number of municipalities 
Aargau 225 Nidwalden 11 
Appenzell Innerrhoden 6 Obwalden 7 
Appenzell Ausserrhoden 20 St. Gallen 86 
Bern 378 Schaffhausen 28 
Basel-Landschaft 86 Solothurn 123 
Basel-Stadt 3 Schwyz 30 
Fribourg 167 Thurgau 80 
Geneva 45 Ticino 168 
Glarus 19 Uri 20 
Graubünden 186 Vaud 364 
Jura 67 Valais 144 
Lucerne 89 Zug 11 
Neuchâtel 54 Zurich 171 
  Total 2588 
Note: The number of Swiss municipalities has strongly decreased during the last decades due to municipal 
mergers. The table indicates the average number of municipalities in the respective canton within the 
analyzed sample of referenda from 2008 to 2012. 
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Table A2. List of Referenda Topics 2008-2012   
   
ID Date  Proposal / Topic of the Referendum 
530 24.02.2008 Initiative "against fighter jet noise in tourist regions" 
531 24.02.2008 Federal law on the improvment of the tax environment for business activities  and investments  
532 01.06.2008 Initiative "for democratic naturalizations" 
533 01.06.2008 Initiative "Popular sovereignity instead of authority propaganda" 
534 01.06.2008 Constitutional article "For quality and efficiency in health insurance" 
535 30.11.2008 Initiative "for the abolition of the statute of limitations regarding pornography offences involving children" 
536 30.11.2008 Initiative "for a flexible AHV-age" 
537 30.11.2008 Initiative "Right of appeal for associations: Stop the obstruction policy - More growth for Switzerland!" 
538 30.11.2008 Initiative "for a reasonable hemp-policy including an effective protection of minors" 
539 30.11.2008 Federal law on narcotics and psychotropic substances 
540 08.02.2009 Federal enactment on the approval of the continuation of the  Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons 
between Switzerland and the European community as well as on the approval of the protocol on the extension of the Agreement to 
Rumania and Bulgaria 
541 17.05.2009 Constitutional article "Future with complementary medicine" (Counter proposal to the initative "Yes to 
complementary medicine") 
542 17.05.2009 Federal enactment on the approval and the implementation of the exchange of notes between Switzerland 
and the European community relating to the adoption of regulations for biometrics in passports and travel documents 
543 27.09.2009 Federal enactment on temporary supplementary funding of the invalidity insurance through an increase in 
the value added tax 
544 27.09.2009 Federal enactment on the waiving of the introduction of the general people's initiative 
545 29.11.2009 Federal enactment to create special funding for tasks related to air traffic 
546 29.11.2009 Initiative "for a ban on the export of war material" 
547 29.11.2009 Initiative "against the construction of minarets" 
548 07.03.2010 Constitutional article on research on humans 
549 07.03.2010 Initative "against animal cruelty and for better legal rights for animals" 
550 07.03.2010 Federal law on occupational retirement, surviving dependants' and disability pension (BVG) (minimum 
conversion rate) 
551 26.09.2010 Federal law on obligatory unemployment insurance and insolvency compensation (unemployment 
insurance act (AVIG)) 
553 28.11.2010 Federal enactment on the initative "In favor of fair taxes. Stop tax competition abuse (initative for tax 
justice)" of 18 June 2010 
5521 28.11.2010 Federal enactment on the initative "for the expulsion of foreign criminals (expulsion initative)" 
5522 28.11.2010 Federal enactment on the deportation of foreign criminals within the framework of the Federal Constitution 
(Counter proposal to initative "For the expulsion of foreign criminals (expulsion initative)" of 10 June 2010 
554 13.02.2011 Initative "Protection against firearms violence" 
555 11.03.2012 Federal enactment on the initative "Stop the excessive construction of secondary homes" 
556 11.03.2012 Initative "In favor of tax-supported building society savings for the purchase of owner-occupied residential 
property and for the financing of constructional energy-saving and environmental measures (building society savings initative)" of 
29 September 2008 
557 11.03.2012 Federal enactment on the initative "6 weeks vacation for everybody" 
558 11.03.2012 Federal enactment on the regulation of betting games in favor of charitable purposes (Counter proposal to 
the initative "For betting games serving the common good" of 29 September 2011 
559 11.03.2012 Fixed Book Price Law (BuPG) of 18 March 2011 
560 17.06.2012 Initative "Owning a home thanks to building society savings" 
561 17.06.2012 Initative "Reinforcing popular rights in foreign policy (Let the people decide on treaties!) 
562 17.06.2012 Amendment to the federal law on health insurance (KVG) (Managed Care) 
563 23.09.2012 Federal enactment on the promotion of youth music (Counter proposal to the initative "youth + music") 
564 23.09.2012 Initative "Safe housing for the elderly" 
565 23.09.2012 Initative "Protection from exposure to tobacco smoke" 
566 25.11.2012 Amendment of 16. March 2012 to the Law on Epizootic Diseases 
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A.3 Further Robustness Tests 
 
We provide estimation results using the percentage match between the MP’s vote and the 
referanda outcome as dependent variable instead of binary match we used in the analysis shown 
in tables 1, 2, and 3 to insure that our results are robust to such alternative definitions of the 
opinion match. The dependent variable in tables A3, A4, and A5 is the actual share of votes in 
residence and neighbor communities that match MP's vote, e.g. if the MP voted "no" on a 
proposal and 55% of votes in a community is "no" in the corresponding referendum, then the 
percentage match between the MP and that community is 55%. Similarly, if 48% of a 
community voted in the same way as the MP then the percentage match is 48%. It is important 
to note that the opinion match (the dependent variable used in Table 1 in the main text) in the 
former case would be 1 whereas it would be 0 in the latter case. Although point estimates for 
the coefficient of Residence Community are smaller in Table A3 than those in Table 1, they 
remain positive and highly significant. Similarly, results shown in tables A4, and A5 yield 
qualitatively and quantitatively comparable results as results based on binary matching results 
presented in the main text (tables 2 and 3). 
 
Moreover, we present additional evidence for robustness using additional subsamples in tables 
A6 and A7, which complement tables 2 and 3 in the main text, respectively. First, we briefly 
describe the content of subsample restrictions in tables A6 and A7. The subsample labeled tight 
referendum is restricted to those referenda that are decided by only a small margin nationwide. 
Other subsamples are restricted to MPs' residence communities which: 
- are birthplace of the resident MP, residence is birthplace (to ensure exogeneity of residency);  
- talk a different language than some of their neighbor communities, other language (to exploit 
another potential source of homophily); 
- are rural, rural community (to ensure results are not due to cities); 
- contain a resident MP that is a farmer, MP is farmer (to ensure exogeneity of residency); 
- are also the official correspondance adress of the resident MP, residence=correspond. (to 
ensure that MPs do not only indicate residency in a community); 
- have several resident MPs with the same opinion AND there is no MP residing in the neighbor 
communities, resident MPs w/same view and no MP in neighbor (to isolate potential 
disturbance from MPs in neighbor communities); 
- have several resident MPs with the same opinion AND there are MPs residing in the neighbor 
communities that have the opposite view as the MPs in the residence community, resident MPs 
w/same view and MPs in neighbor w/opposite view (to analyze a situation where strong resident 
MP bias should be present). 
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Table A3. Representation of the Resident Community - -using Percentage Match 
   
A. Residence Community vs. All Neighbor Communities  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Residence Community 0.0124*** 
(0.004) 
0.0124*** 
(0.004) 
0.0124*** 
(0.003) 
0.0119*** 
(0.003)  
Intercept
0.542*** 
(0.005) 
0.561 
*** 
(0.026) 
0.547 
*** 
(0.029) 
0.577*** 
(0.026)  
Referendum FE no yes yes yes  
Canton FE no no yes no  
MP FE no no no yes  
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0005 0.165 0.174 0.217  
Observations 53403 53403 53403 53403  
   
B. Residence Community vs. a Single "Synthetic" Neighbor Community  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Residence Community 0.0126*** 
(0.003) 
0.0126*** 
(0.003) 
0.0126*** 
(0.003) 
0.0126*** 
(0.003)  
Intercept 0.542*** 
(0.003) 
0.585*** 
(0.019) 
0.571*** 
(0.022) 
0.628*** 
(0.02)  
Referendum FE no yes yes yes  
Canton FE no no yes no  
MP FE no no no yes  
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0013 0.189 0.195 0.248  
Observations 11908 11908 11908 11908  
Note: Dependent var. is the percentage match between MP's vote and ref. outcome.  
         Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by residence-neighbor-pair. 
 
         ***, **, and * denote significance levels p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
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Table A4. Representation of the Resident Community – Robustness – using Percentage Match 
       
 A. Residence Community vs. All Neighbor Communities 
 
Residence is 
Birthplace No Border Local Office
Long Time 
before 
Voting 
Resident 
MPs w/same 
View 
Neighbor 
MPs w/same 
View 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Residence Community 0.012** 
(4.8e-03) 
0.011*** 
(3.5e-03) 
0.011*** 
(3.3e-03) 
0.013*** 
(4.2e-03) 
0.048*** 
(7.5e-03) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
Intercept 0.574*** 
(0.035) 
0.574*** 
(0.027) 
0.556*** 
(0.029) 
0.532*** 
(0.022) 
0.652*** 
(3.7e-04) 
0.624*** 
(5.4e-04) 
Referendum FE yes yes yes yes no no 
Canton FE no no no no no no 
MP FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.246 0.223 0.213 0.112 0.228 0.107 
Observations 18202 48148 31317 18028 6265 12445 
   
B. Residence Community vs. a Single "Synthetic" Neighbor Community 
Residence is 
Birthplace No Border Local Office
Long Time 
before 
Voting 
Resident 
MPs w/same 
View 
Neighbor 
MPs w/same 
View 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Residence Community 0.015*** 
(4.2e-03) 
0.012*** 
(3.1e-03) 
0.012*** 
(3.2e-03) 
0.014*** 
(3.7e-03) 
0.047*** 
(6.3e-03) 
0.015 
(9.8e-03) 
Intercept 0.627*** 
(0.029) 
0.627*** 
(0.020) 
0.610*** 
(0.023) 
0.589*** 
(0.018) 
0.659*** 
(3.1e-03) 
0.648*** 
(4.9e-03) 
Referendum FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Canton FE no no no no no yes 
MP FE yes yes yes yes yes no 
R-squared 0.282 0.246 0.238 0.151 0.295 0.152 
Observations 3528 11970 6840 4014 1082 2344 
Note: Dependent var. is the percentage match between MP's vote and ref. 
outcome.  
      Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by residence-neighbor-pair. 
      ***, **, and * denote significance levels p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.   
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Table A5. Resident MP Bias and Size Difference of Resident and Neighbor Communities –using Percentage Match 
 
 
A. Residence Community vs. All Neighbor Communities 
 All All Local Office 
Long Time 
before 
Voting 
Resident 
MPs w/same 
View 
Neighbor 
MPs w/same 
View 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Residence Community 0.017*** 
(6.3e-03) 
0.024*** 
(4.9e-03) 
0.023*** 
(4.9e-03) 
0.029*** 
(5.9e-03) 
0.055*** 
(0.016) 
0.025 
(0.016) 
Size Difference (Residence-
Neighbor) -2.3e-03 
(5.2e-03) 
5.4e-03 
(3.8e-03) 
5.5e-03 
(5.1e-03) 
8.1e-03* 
(4.2e-03) 
4.2e-03 
(0.022) 
2.4e-03 
(6.3e-03) 
Residence*SizeDifference 0.019** 
(7.4e-03) 
0.021*** 
(7.0e-03) 
0.021*** 
(6.4e-03) 
0.026*** 
(8.9e-03) 
0.035* 
(0.019) 
0.029 
(0.025) 
Intercept 0.549*** 
(0.028) 
0.572*** 
(0.025) 
0.550*** 
(0.027) 
0.524*** 
(0.021) 
0.648*** 
(0.020) 
0.622*** 
(5.7e-03) 
Referendum FE yes yes yes yes no no 
Canton FE yes no no no no no 
MP FE no yes yes yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.174 0.217 0.213 0.113 0.228 0.108 
Observations 53403 53403 31317 18028 6265 12445 
 
 
B. Residence Comm. vs. a Single "Synthetic" Neighbor Comm. 
 All All Local Office 
Long Time 
before 
Voting 
Resident 
MPs w/same 
View 
Neighbor 
MPs w/same 
View 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Residence Community 0.019*** 
(4.5e-03) 
0.019*** 
(4.5e-03) 
0.018*** 
(3.8e-03) 
0.021*** 
(5.7e-03) 
0.049*** 
(6.2e-03) 
0.025* 
(0.014) 
Size Difference (Residence-
Neighbor) 6.1e-04 (7.9e-03) 
-0.084*** 
(0.032) 
-0.114*** 
(0.031) 
-0.078 
(0.056) 
-0.067 
(0.441) 
-0.120*** 
(0.026) 
Residence*SizeDifference 0.016** 
(7.4e-03) 
0.016** 
(7.4e-03) 
0.016** 
(7.7e-03) 
0.020** 
(9.3e-03) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
0.034 
(0.023) 
Intercept 0.573*** 
(0.022) 
0.628*** 
(0.020) 
0.614*** 
(0.023) 
0.589*** 
(0.018) 
0.545*** 
(0.089) 
0.648*** 
(7.2e-03) 
Referendum FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Canton FE yes no no no no yes 
MP FE no yes yes yes yes no 
R-squared 0.196 0.249 0.24 0.152 0.737 0.156 
Observations 11908 11908 6840 4014 1082 2344 
Note: Dependent var. is the percentage match between MP's vote and ref. 
outcome.   
     Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by residence-neighbor-pair. 
     ***, **, and * denote significance levels p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.   
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 Table A6. Representation of the Resident Community - Further Robustness Tests 
 A. Residence Community vs. All Neighbor Communities 
 Other Language 
Rural 
Community MP is Farmer 
Residence = 
Correspond. 
Tight 
Referendum 
Resident MPs w/same View 
and NO MP in Neighbor  
Resident MPs w/same View 
and MPs in Neighbor 
w/opposite View  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Residence Community 0.117 
(0.086) 
0.105** 
(0.048) 
0.085 
(0.088) 
0.102* 
(0.055) 
0.206* 
(0.113) 
1.548** 
(0.621) 
0.944*** 
(0.301) 
Intercept -0.645 
(0.575) 
1.905*** 
(0.431) 
1.872*** 
(0.527) 
0.345 
(0.347) 
2.059*** 
(0.168) 
9.874*** 
(2.198) 
-1.433*** 
(0.036) 
Referendum FE yes yes yes yes yes yes no 
Canton FE no no no no no no no 
MP FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.25 0.31 0.38 0.19 0.271 0.74 0.26 
Observations 3280 11968 6669 18669 6552 1628 1881 
 B. Residence Community vs. a Single "Synthetic" Neighbor Community 
 Other Language 
Rural 
Community MP is Farmer 
Residence = 
Correspond. 
Tight 
Referendum 
Resident MPs w/same View 
and NO MP in Neighbor  
Resident MPs w/same View 
and MPs in Neighbor 
w/opposite View  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Residence Community 0.155 
(0.112) 
0.146** 
(0.065) 
0.166 
(0.110) 
0.113* 
(0.063) 
0.374** 
(0.155) 
2.829** 
(1.227) 
1.168** 
(0.460) 
Intercept -0.211 
(0.640) 
1.309*** 
(0.472) 
1.719*** 
(0.616) 
1.521*** 
(0.361) 
12.802*** 
(1.030) 
9.090*** 
(2.418) 
-1.768*** 
(0.298) 
Referendum FE yes yes yes yes yes yes no 
Canton FE no no no no no no no 
MP FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.30 0.36 0.42 0.24 0.466 0.85 0.42 
Observations 780 3174 1666 4138 1466 316 362 
Note: Dependent var. is the matching between MP's vote and ref. outcome. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by residence-neighbor-pair.  
         ***, **, and * denote significance levels p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
  
44 
Table A7. Resident MP Bias and Size Difference of Resident and Neighbor Communities- Further Subsamples 
A. Residence Community 
vs. All Neighbor 
Communities 
Residence is 
Birthplace 
Other 
Language 
Rural 
Community 
MP is 
Farmer 
Residence = 
Correspond. 
Tight 
Referendum 
Resident MPs w/same 
View and NO MP in 
Neighbor  
Resident MPs w/same 
View and MPs in 
Neighbor w/opposite 
View  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Residence community 0.219*** 
(0.067) 
0.274** 
(0.129) 
0.121 
(0.119) 
0.732** 
(0.368) 
0.275*** 
(0.104) 
0.560*** 
(0.198) 
2.711** 
(1.079) 
1.393** 
(0.589) 
Size Difference (Residence-
Neighbor) 
0.056 
(0.082) 
0.027 
(0.120) 
0.048 
(0.061) 
0.336** 
(0.133) 
0.081 
(0.083) 
0.242 
(0.149) 0.788 (0.741) 
-0.132 
(0.602) 
Residence*SizeDifference 0.121 
(0.125) 
0.377* 
(0.205) 
-0.037 
(0.182) 
0.541 
(0.585) 
0.264* 
(0.149) 
0.417 
(0.295) 
2.417 
(1.507) 
1.927*** 
(0.581) 
Intercept 0.615* 
(0.356) 
-0.620 
(0.574) 
1.921*** 
(0.432) 
1.782*** 
(0.511) 
0.254 
(0.339) 
1.833*** 
(0.183) 
9.012*** 
(2.401) 
-1.400*** 
(0.514) 
Referendum fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no 
Canton fixed effects no no no no no no no no 
MP fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.20 0.25 0.31 0.39 0.19 0.273 0.74 0.27 
Observations 18202 3280 11968 6669 18669 6552 1628 1881 
Note: Dependent var. is the matching between MP's vote and ref. outcome. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by residence-neighbor-pair.  
         ***, **, and * denote significance levels p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
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Table A7. Resident MP Bias and Size Difference of Resident and Neighbor Communities- Further Subsamples (continued) 
B. Residence Comm. vs. a Single 
"Synthetic" Neighbor Comm. 
Residence is 
Birthplace 
Other 
Language 
Rural 
Community 
MP is 
Farmer 
Residence = 
Correspond. 
Tight 
Referendum 
Resident MPs w/same 
View and NO MP in 
Neighbor  
Resident MPs w/same 
View and MPs in 
Neighbor w/opposite 
View  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Residence community 0.202*** 
(0.072) 
0.335** 
(0.156) 
0.220 
(0.145) 
0.118 
(0.551) 
0.240** 
(0.104) 
0.554** 
(0.237) 
2.471** 
(0.995) 
1.714*** 
(0.475) 
Size Difference (Residence-
Neighbor) 
-1.901 
(1.305) 
1.877 
(1.711) 
1.356 
(1.888) 
-4.822*** 
(1.296) 
1.423 
(1.613) 
-1.297 
(2.506) 0.707 (1.586) 
-10.932 
(22.071) 
Residence*SizeDifference 0.051 
(0.118) 
0.502* 
(0.297) 
0.116 
(0.246) 
-0.073 
(0.828) 
0.312* 
(0.168) 
0.458 
(0.406) 
2.273 
(2.229) 
1.846** 
(0.865) 
Intercept 1.476*** 
(0.437) 
1.629 
(1.618) 
2.588 
(1.810) 
-2.071* 
(1.104) 
0.846 
(0.738) 
12.782*** 
(1.044) 
1.385 
(2.084) 
-1.822*** 
(0.529) 
Referendum fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no 
Canton fixed effects no no no no no no yes no 
MP fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.23 0.31 0.36 0.42 0.24 0.468 0.78 0.43 
Observations 3528 780 3174 1666 4138 1466 316 362 
Note: Dependent var. is the matching between MP's vote and ref. outcome. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by residence-neighbor-pair.  
         ***, **, and * denote significance levels p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
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A.4 MPs' Characteristics and the Resident MP Bias 
For each MP we create a measure of agreement with her residence community (ARC): for each 
referendum outcome, the MP is assigned 1, if her vote matches with the outcome in her 
residence community but not that in neighbor communities; assigned -1 if her vote matches 
neighbor community but not her residence community; and assigned 0 if her vote matches both 
or neither communities. Taking the average of these values for each MP over all referenda, we 
create an individual measure for an MP's ARC. Results of regressing ARC on individual 
characterisctics of MPs are shown in Table A8. Time spent in council has a non-linear effect: 
up to about eight years it is positively correlated with an MP's ARC. After eight years, more 
time in the council is correlated with decreasing ARC. MPs associated with left wing parties 
have higher ARC on average. MPs who did not change their residence since birth have higher 
ARC on average. This is not a surprising result, since such an individual would be expected to 
have better established long-term relationships within that community, and this is what we also 
exploit in our robustness analysis in the paper.   
 
 
Table A8. Resident MP Bias and the Individual Characteristics of MPs    
dependent variable: average yearly ARC of MPs  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Intercept -0.008 (0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.025) 
Gender  0.051***(0.02) 
0.024 
(0.02) 
Residence is same as BirthPlace   0.028* (0.015) 
Graduate Education   -0.021 (0.016) 
Children   0.008 (0.02) 
 
Married   -0.003 (0.02) 
Army   0.01 (0.02) 
Interest Groups   0.003**(0.001) 
PartyLeft 0.119***(0.02)  
0.129***
(0.02) 
PartyRight 0.007 (0.016)   
0.017 
(0.017) 
R-squared 0,076 0,014 0,091 
Observations 1060 1060 1055 
Note: Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by residence-neighbor-pair. 
         ***, **, and * denote significance levels p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
 
